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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. Historically, output in the smallholder agricultural sector has been relatively low, as 
reflected by the low level of contribution to the market. In 1979, less than 5,000 commercial 
farmers produced Z$362 million of agricultural output, while 9,000 Purchase Area farmers 
produced about Z$10 million and 640,000 communal area farmers Z$15,4 million of 
agricultural output. It is generally argued that the smallholder sector was not very 
productive because of lack of essential support services such as relevant technical research, 
extension, price support, marketing and financial services.
2 In development literature, it has been argued that economic growth is to a very large 
extent a function of the rate of investment. In agriculture, in order to shift production 
functions upward, farmers must be able to invest in new improved technologies such as high 
yielding varieties and fertilisers. The rate of investment has been seen to be heavily 
influenced by the availability of financial services whose key functions include mobilization 
and allocation of savings. If financial markets fail to mobilise and allocate savings, profits 
become lower than would otherwise have been and performance of the entire economic 
system may be impaired. In Zimbabwe, failure of the financial system to address people’s 
needs has been seen to impair growth in the smallholder agricultural sector.
3. The development of rural finance has been characterized by the channelling of cheap 
credit to a small proportion of farming households and the very limited provision of markets 
that mobilise savings. This direction of development supports the belief that rural 
households do not have the propensity to save and therefore they can not invest. Because 
the formal sector does not provide adequate financial services to the rural sector, the 
informal sector has risen to fill in the gap. In the process of Zimbabwe’s economic 
development, the two financial sectors formal and informal, have grown side by side. Their 
main aim has been to increase productivity in the various economic sub-sectors.
4. Since 1980, Zimbabwe’s agricultural policy statements have been dominated by the 
need to increase productivity and improve the standard of living in the smallholder sector. 
Between 1980 and 1985, there was a dramatic increase in output recorded in the smallholder 
sector. This was due to farmers returning to their land after the end of the war of liberation 
and the provision of a whole package of support services which included technical research, 
extension, price support, marketing infrastructure and finance. Growth in output could not 
be attributed to one factor, but to a combination of all the above. Although credit was 
important even, non borrowers experienced this growth in productivity, confirming the fact 
that credit alone is not the key determinant.
5. Because supply of land is inelastic, increased agricultural productivity is to a very 
large extent a function of the rate of investment in improved technologies. As indicated 
above, the rate of investment itself is dependent upon availability of finance either through 
loans or savings. Most households in the smallholder sector are believed to have a low 
marginal propensity to save, and therefore are not able to invest from savings. This has
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partly explained why government of Zimbabwe (in common with many other governments 
in developing countries) has focused on the provision of credit, as a strategy for smallholder 
development. Such credit is often subsidized - which plaees a heavy drain on scarce national 
capital resources. And, as a corollary, little attention is paid to savings mobilisation. But 
experience has shown that most smallholder farmers are high risk borrowers so that their 
capacity to use credit efficiently and repay their loans is questionable.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCE IN THE AGRICULTURALSECTOR
6. Until Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, financial development was geared towards 
the more commercially oriented sectors. Smallholder producers requiring financial 
intermediation had to travel to urban centres and carry out their transactions at these urban 
- based institutions. The types of financial services they could access were very limited and 
information on various forms of financial investments such as securities and stocks did not 
easily reach rural areas. Of more significance, loans to invest in various forms of productive 
enterprises were not available.
7. The large - scale commercial farming sector has historically enjoyed a great deal of 
financial support from successive colonial governments, through both public and private 
institutions. As far back as 1924, the Land Bank was established to assist large-scale 
commercial farmers to acquire farm land. It facilitated acquisition of farm land by a 
significant number of white commercial farmers who would have otherwise been unable to 
afford the land. Another scheme that assisted large-scale commercial fanners (whites) in 
acquiring land was one introduced at the recommendation of the Danziger Commission. 
The Commission recommended the abolition of interest on loans for capital development 
such as purchase of farms and loan repayments were deferred for three years. In 1935, a 
subsidy programme - was launched to allow farmers to build dams. After the World war, a 
scheme to facilitate ex-service men’s entry into commercial fanning was launched. Under 
this scheme, government purchased farms and allocated them to ex-servicemen. In addition 
to financial grants these emergent farmers were given free intensive training, resident on a 
farm, under supervision of an established farmer with the cost of living and allowances met 
by government.
8. In 1930, the Southern Rhodesian government for the first time extended credit to 
peasant farmers who were on Trust Land Irrigation Schemes. The credit was made 
available on a very small scale and was provided in the form of physical inputs and services. 
Costs of these inputs and services were deducted from revenue received from sales of 
products. This type of repayment is referred to as stop-order system. It was not until 1956 
that credit to dry-land farmers was introduced, through the African Development Fund, and 
through the African Co-operative Societies between 1956 and 1958 (Whitsun Foundation 
1981). The use of co-operatives to make credit available to Trust Land and Purchase Area 
farmers continued until 1979 when the AFC started making advances to Trust Land 
Farmers.
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9. Until 8th February 1979, the Agricultural Finance Corporation was precluded from 
making loan advances to farmers in communal areas. Although the AFC’s Small Farm 
Credit Scheme was introduced in 1978, it was initially designed to service Purchase Area 
farmers, particularly for seasonal finance.
10. The shift towards the inclusion of communal area farmers in 1979 was due to the 
changing political environment. The provision in the AFC Act, Chapter 109, which 
precluded AFC from lending to communal area farmers could no longer be accepted in an 
independent Zimbabwe. The relevant provision, (subsection 3 of section 22) read as 
follows:
"The Corporation shall not make advances to a tribesman as defined in 
section 37 of the Land Tenure Act (Chapter 148) in relation to any operations 
carried on by that person on Tribal Trust Land".
This provision was repealed on February 9th 1979.
THE ROLE OF INFORMAL FINANCE
11. It is often argued that the size of the informal financial sector is a reflection of lack 
of development of the formal financial sector. In rural Zimbabwe, informal finance is 
predominant particularly in the area of savings mobilization by mainly women’s groups. 
Savings clubs constitute the single largest movement mobilizing rural finance. These clubs 
come under a number of umbrella organizations such as the Self-Help Development 
Foundation (SDF), the Association of Women’s Clubs (AWC), Input Suppliers such- as 
Agricura, Windmill, and various churches.
12. Membership of savings clubs has been increasing steadily since the sixties. Data for 
those clubs affiliated to the SDF, which until the late eighties was known as the Savings 
Development Movement, are more readily available. Table 1 shows the growth in 
membership between 1970 and 1991. The current total membership is estimated to be 
standing around half a million. (SDF, 1994). Over 75% of savings club members are women. 
A study carried out by IFAD in 1985 estimated that over 30% of rural households had 
members belonging to informal financial groups. Of these, close to 19% were members of 
SDF savings clubs (see Table II). According to current statistics provided by SDF, this 
percentage has since gone up.
13. Savings clubs have mobilized millions of dollars in rural areas which they have 
deposited in urban-based financial institutions. In 1994, SDF estimated total deposits by 
savings clubs to be over $5million. These deposits are invested mainly in urban centres 
because financial institutions which collect the deposits do not advance loans to savings club 
members for investment in rural areas. These informal groups mobilize savings for formal 
financial institutions and bear the bulk of transaction costs. Clubs collect small deposits
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from individual members, record the amounts and take them to financial institutions where 
they deposit them. All these transaction costs are borne by savings club members , who only 
get an interest rate that is frequently below the rate of inflation. A number of studies in 
-different regions have shown low interest rate elasticities suggesting that other factors such 
as convenience and safety may far outweigh interest rates in determining the desire to save. 
(Wai 1977, Chimedza, 1993)
14. With respect to informal lending this activity is not as widespread as savings 
mobilization. Pure money lending is not as common in rural areas as it is in urban areas. 
A large part of the informal lending in rural areas takes place between relatives or friends 
and it is often interest-free. A significant proportion of credit facility may be operated by 
local retailers. This includes loans for things ranging from household items to agricultural 
inputs and equipment. Here, the arrangement is informal. Some of the more widespread 
informal lending initiatives tend to have a savings and credit element. Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are a case in point. Members of ROSCAs deposit an agreed 
sum at regular periods and pay out the pooled savings to individual members on a rotational 
basis. The whole concept involves making a number of deposits which one withdraws at 
some date in the future. In many cases the use of this money is targeted. Whatever the use 
is, these savings alleviate cash flow problems of those involved.
15. One of the major objectives of savings clubs has been to mobilise savings for the 
purpose of purchasing inputs. In using their savings they run the risk of losing their past 
income when there are crop failures. The future income from investment in inputs is not 
guaranteed. This is the same risk that credit institutions take. Where loans are subsidised 
and administrative costs are high, the risk taken by lending istitution is even greater.
16. In many cases, these informal groups provide training, supervisory and advisory 
services for the sustenance of the enterprise. Informal finance is designed by the people to 
meet their special needs. It has flexibility, ease of transactions and rapidity in 
implementation. These important features make informal finance suited to the needs of low 
income people. It is however very clear from the operations of savings clubs that informal 
finance does not always stand on its own. It links up with formal finance at some point. 
Through holding savings club deposits in formal financial institutions, informally mobilized 
savings link with formal services. It may be that in order to develop financial systems that 
service rural areas effectively, one needs to look to both formal and informal systems and 
draw the best elements from each of them.
AFC’s LENDING TO THE SMALLHOLDER SECTOR
17 During the first year of lending to smallholder producers, a group of 2,846 loans 
amounting to $478,000 were granted to communal area farmers with the assistance of the 
Department of Agricultural Development (Devag) on a pilot project basis. The manager of 
the Small Farm Credit Scheme was authorised to grant loans of up to $10,000.00 per
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individual, including existing indebtedness. Most seasonal loans were made available in the 
form of inputs except for limited cash disbursements for payment of labour. The 
programme was extended in the 1980/81 season with the disbursement of 18,000 loans 
valued at Z$4,8 million.
18. In 1985, numbers of small farmers loans reached their peak at 77,526 with a total 
value of $38.9 million. Thereafter, the number of loans started to decline while the value 
increased in real terms Table III (AFC 1994).
19. Right from the beginning, it was recognized that lending to smallholder farmers v/as 
more risky and that operational costs per dollar would be higher than they were in large- 
scale commercial lending, and therefore government accepted the responsibility of 
indemnifying the AFC for the difference between the return on lending and lending costs. 
In addition, government also acts as guarantor of small farm lending.
AVAILABLE SPECIAL SCHEMES
20. The Agricultural Assistance Scheme was established, along side with the Small Farm 
Credit Scheme. It advanced loans for more than normal business risks. The establishment 
of the Agricultural Assistance Scheme was a recognition of special circumstances that may 
arise, requiring particular kinds of financial innovations. This is an area that has not been 
well developed in Zimbabwe and yet it provides potential for growth in agricultural support 
industries. The Tenant Farming Scheme was another innovation that was meant to respond 
to special needs. Tenant farmers could benefit from this scheme after satisfying AFC that 
they had the necessary experience and ability and could contribute not less than 10% of 
advances. Loans under this scheme were not underwritten by government and therefore the 
AFC was highly selective because it carried the full risk of loss.
21. While credit facilities to communal area farmers were being introduced on a limited 
scale, large-scale commercial farmers continued to benefit disproportionately more than any 
group. In addition to finance for land acquisition and improvement, large amounts of 
seasonal loans were advanced by AFC (see Table III). This was not their only source of 
formal agricultural credit. Commercial banks and input suppliers also provided a significant 
proportion of credit requirements. By 1980, AFC accounted for 38% of the large-scale 
commercial farmers’ short-term credit requirements, while commercial banks supplied 34% 
and co-operatives and companies, 28%. (Slangen, 1989). Table IV clearly shows that large- 
scale commercial farmers have had alternative sources of formal finance, while communal 
area farmers have been totally dependent on public lending institutions such as the African 
Loan Fund and subsequently the AFC.
22. The land resettlement programme which was launched after independence, was 
designed with its special loan fund. The three resettlement models, A B and C had credit 
schemes that were designed to help farmers achieve the objective of producing surplus for
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the market. Model B schemes which are collective co-operatives were initially provided with 
settlement grants and then loan funds. In 1981/82 ,the first loans valued at Z$10,6 million 
were advanced to farmers on resettlement schemes (AFCT982, and 1984).
23. It was soon realized that loan funds under the resettlement programme were not 
adequate. This was particularly true for the model B collective co-operative schemes which 
were trying to operate large-scale farms along the same lines as the privately owned ones. 
Some members of Model B collective cooperatives, who recognized inadequacy of finance 
as a serious impediment in their efforts to operate their enterprises along profit making lines 
decided to take an initiative and identify or help develop alternative sources of finance. 
They believed that for them to succeed in the absence of such specialised financial 
institutions as cooperative or Rural Development Banks, they had to break into existing 
formal financial markets and borrow at commercial interest rates. To facilitate this process, 
a group of co-operators came together in 1988 and started a specialist scheme called the 
Collecting Self-Financing Scheme, (CSFS). This is a guarantee scheme formulated and 
controlled by collective co-operatives. It seeks to utilise bank finance for their development. 
To date, it has relied on donors for guarantee funds. The scheme has broken the reluctance 
of banks to lend to co-operatives.
24. In addition to supporting existing mainstream activities commercial banks have also 
supported diversification activities such as game ranching, export horticulture etc. In most 
cases, banks are reluctant to provide long-term finance for diversification because the risk 
is higher. AFC has made substantial funds available for farming operations which are 
starting up. Again, the risk in these new operations is high.
25. A number of financial innovations have been developed to meet special needs of 
large-scale commercial farmers. From 1980 to 1989, there was a decline in AFC’s large-
• scale commercial farm lending despite the Corporation’s relatively more favourable lending 
rates. A major factor in their decline was the breakdown of AFC’s computer system in 1986 
and 1987. This created problems whereby a lot of data was lost and never recovered. Some 
farmers were seriously inconvenienced and lost confidence in the Corporation while others 
benefited. However, some of the clients lost through this mishap were regained when AFC 
established a special scheme to provide its clients special access to foreign exchange for 
equipment. The World Bank supported Agricultural Credit and Export Promotion Project 
contributed significantly to AFC’s recovery of the large-scale commercial farm market. It 
became quite clear that for this group of farmers, availability of finance was not a constraint. 
What was of concern to them was their lack of access to foreign exchange for purchase of 
equipment. With the recent liberalization of the financial sector and in general the opening 
up of the economy, there do not seem to be any serious deficiencies in financial markets 
serving the large-scale commercial farming sector.
26. On the contrary, formal financial services in the smallholder sector face serious 
deficiencies. This is to a large extent reflected in the persistence and expansion of informal 
finance in this sector. At its lending peak, the AFC, the only formal financial institution
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providing agricultural loans to smallholder producers, advanced loans to only 10% of 
communal area farmers. This is way below real demand. The remaining 90% had to resort 
to self-financing and informal sources. It is estimated that the major source of production 
finance is crop sales. Remittances from household members in wage employment, off-farm 
income from such activities as brickmaking, beer brewing and sale of labour and savings 
(which often times are major part of income from crop sales) are also important sources of 
finance.
27. Until 1980, the few formal financial institutions which were available in rural areas 
confined themselves to accepting deposits and did not engage in lending activities at all. 
Due to the deliberate policy to promote faster growth in the smallholder sector in general 
and the communal areas in particular, government encouraged the decentralization of 
formal financial institutions into rural areas. In addition, because the favourable policy 
environment led to increases in agricultural output resulting in improved, incomes, there was 
increased demand for financial services, to which formal institutions responded in a limited 
way. By 1991, the Post Office Savings Bank, all Building Societies and most commercial 
banks had branches, sub-branches and agencies in rural areas. Table V shows the 
distribution of formal financial institutions countrywide in 1992. However, these institutions 
continue to confine themselves to savings mobilisation without advancing loans.
SUPPLY OF CREDIT TO THE SMALLHOLDER SECTOR
28. The AFC continues to be the single largest source of institutional agricultural credit 
for communal and resettlement areas. In the Zimbabwean context, the perception is that 
AFC has both social, moral and economic obligations to farmers. Social or moral 
obligations have dictated the fixing of lending rates at lower than the market interest rates, 
about 13% between 1981 and 1991. These obligations have also dictated that government 
underwrites loans to smallholder producers, allowing AFC to continue with development 
activities as opposed to having commercial ones only. This provides an explanation as to 
why AFC continues to lend to a sector where it is losing $0.16 on every dollar lent to 
communal area farmers and $0.26 on each dollar lent through the resettlement credit 
scheme, while lending to large-scale commercial farmers yields $0.07 profit on each dollar 
(AFC, 1990).
29. Short-term credit constitutes AFC’s largest lending category for all groups of farmers 
including the large-scale commercial farmers. In 1988/89, short-term lending accounted for 
90% share of loans granted, whose value was 82% of total funds. During the following year, 
1989/90 shares of short-term loan numbers remained at 90% but their value dropped to 
70% (AFC, 1990). In the category of communal area farmers alone, 91% of loans granted 
or 92% of funds went to short-term lending in 1989/90, while proportions for large-scale 
commercial farmers were 61% share of loans, taking up 75% of total disbursements. 
Although the number of short-term loans granted to large-scale commercial farmers was
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very small, 590 compared to 39,911 for communal areas, their value was disproportionately 
high at $102,35 million compared, to. $30.85 million granted to communal, area farmers 
(AFC, 1990). This meant that command area farmers accounted for 98 % share of loans 
whose value was only 23% of total funds disbursed as short-term loans, while the reverse 
was true for commercial farmers.
30. la rg e  scale commercial farmers, whose loan share in numbers constituted 3% of the 
total,-accounted for 85-%-of financial resources granted during the 1990/91 season (AFC, 
1991). This has been the pattern of credit distribution since the establishment of the AFC 
Small Farm Credit Scheme in 1979.
31. . Disparities in resource distribution do not only occur among various farmer 
categories hut also along regional lines. The most productive provinces tend to get a larger 
share of loan funds. Out of the eight provinces, two accounted for 57% of loan funds 
granted (AFC, 1991). Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central which have some of 
the most productive cropping land get the largest share of AFC loans. This is in line with 
AFC’s deliberate policy of targeting loans to farmers with the greatest potential for 
repayment.
32. The AFC witnessed rapid rise in the number of loans granted from a grand total of 
23,859 in 1980/81 to a peak of 95,269 in 1985/86, thereafter declining to a low of 36,742 in 
1990/91 (AFC, 1991). The number of loans continued to decline reaching a  low of 22,319 
in 1993 (AFC, 1994). Much of the decline was experienced in the Communal farming areas. 
From 1990 to 1992, there was a steady increase in the commercial farmers loan share.
33. The recent .growth in loan demand by large scale farmers has been attributed to the 
diversification of AFC’s lending operations. Such expanding operations .as horticultural 
production and game ranching are placing increased demand for credit. Diversification is 
not only confined to large-scale commercial farming operations. The smallholder sector has 
also benefited from it. However, demand fox loans in this sector has not increased despite 
the fact that lack of finance continues to fee cited as one of the major constraints in the 
expansion of agricultural output In this sub-sector, lack  of growth in demand for loans by 
smallholder producers is an indication that the system is not working efficiently.
FACTORS HINDERING DEMAND FOR DOANS BY SMALLHOLDER PRODUCERS
34. AFC’s lending activities in the smallholder sector have not produced the desired 
results. In addition to the continued decline in the demand since 1986, rates of repayment 
have not been pleasing for most of the time. In January 1990, 80%, 68% and 11% of 
communal area, small-scale commercial and resettlement loan recipients respectively were 
in arrears (World Bank, 1991). At the same time, AFC was making a loss on every dollar 
it lent to and recovered from these farmers. Transaction costs were high while interest rates 
remained fixed below commercial rates. It may not be wrong to assume that there was a
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problem, particularly with the supply side of the scheme. Why were farmers not willing to 
take advantage of cheap loans?
35. In much of financial development literature, interest rates have been identified as key 
determinants in demand for loans. In Zimbabwe, however, it can be argued that demand 
for loans is interest rate inelastic. (Chimedza’s (1993) study found that interest rates were 
not a significant factor in the farmers decision to use credit. This then attributes farmers’ 
unwillingness to take advantage of cheap loans to other factors.
36. Some studies have identified the stop-order repayment system as one of the major 
factors responsible for farmers’ reluctance to borrow. The system has been unpopular with 
many farmers because:
a) the stop-order system forces all loan recipients to market through the Grain 
Marketing board even where it is not the most convenient way.
b) confining credit to recommended input packages erroneously assumes homogeneity 
in the conditions, knowledge and experiences of farmers. Obviously such rigidity 
results in some farmers losing out. For example, some farmers have greater access 
to manure from their livestock and other organic materials. Through experience they 
have come to realise that their soils are more responsive to a certain mixture of 
organic manure and fertiliser. Such farmers may find that what they need is less of 
the fertiliser and more of herbicides and insecticides. On the other hand those 
farmers who do not have access to organic manure would be totally dependent on 
fertilisers for their soil fertility. Their fertiliser needs may turn out to be a lot higher 
than of the other group. Such diversity in requirements has not been taken into 
account in advancing credit to smallholders.
c) administration of the stop-order system delays payments to farmers. Sometimes it 
can take up to six months before farmers are paid for their produce. This creates 
serious cash-flow problems for many farmers.
d) when loan deductions are made by GMB after sales, they are not staggered even 
where deliveries are staggered. This means that the full loan may be deducted from 
the first payment, leaving the farmer with very little or nothing at all, at a time when 
they need their money the most.
37. In the current economic reform programme the stop-order system is becoming 
irrelevant. The AFC has responded to the new economic order and is in the process of 
phasing out this repayment system.
38. AFC’s size of loans to smallholder farmers is another explanation for farmers’ 
reluctance to borrow. In most cases, loans granted are considerably smaller than those 
requested and are too small to be productive. In 1990 the average loan granted to a
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communal area borrower was valued at $761.76. This was enough to purchase inputs 
recommended for 2.6 hectares of maize in Natural Region III. Considering that the average 
size of-land under cultivation per household in communal areas is estimated to be 5 
hectares, this means that-AFC loans account for less than 50% of input requirements. A 
study conducted in Zvimba (1986) found that AFC loans accounted for only 21% of total 
input costs for sample households. Most of these households felt that the loans were not 
adequate and they had to supplement them with own savings.
39. The cost of loans to the borrower has been a lot higher than is often assumed. Loan 
application procedures require that farmers meet the loan officers at designated points on 
days and times that suit the loans officers. For some farmers, this entails travelling long 
distances and spending whole days away from their homes and work. In cases where input 
deliveries are delayed, this may lead to late planting which results in reduced yields. This 
situation is now being addressed by AFC and the incidence has been reduced. The delay 
in processing payments is partly due to the fact that marketing boards have to collect loan 
repayments for AFC by deducting them from proceeds from marketed produce. Processing 
these stop-orders appears to be time consuming. Waiting for five months before receiving 
payment for produce delivered is quite costly. Assuming one would have deposited the 
money in a bank account, it would mean a loss of five months’ interest. If one had 
alternative investment options with higher returns, the loss would even be greater. All these 
costs plus the interest rates paid by farmers make borrowing not viable for many. Although 
there does not seem to be any research done to quantify all these losses, it is a very useful 
exercise particularly at this point when there is concern about developing more efficient 
financial institutions that are responsive to the heterogeneous needs of the rural population.
40. Well known constraints - chronic cash shortages, poor performance of improved 
technology, severe manpower shortages at critical peak labour times - mean that a large 
proportion of the population in communal areas is not able to use commercial credit (as 
offered by institutions such as the AFC) efficiently. However, this does not mean that such 
cannot benefit from the provision of financial services. What it means is that the type of 
service that AFC has offered them has not been the most appropriate because it has not 
effectively addressed their needs.
41. Patrick (1966) identified two phenomena in financial development which he termed 
"Demand Following" and "Supply Leading". The "Demand Following" approach takes the 
view that lack of financial institutions in underdeveloped countries is simply an indication 
of the lack of demand for the services. According to this approach, the more rapid the 
growth rate of real national output the greater will be the demand by investors for financial 
intermediation. The "Supply Leading" approach takes the view that financial institutions are 
created and they supply their assets, liabilities and related financial services in advance of 
demand for them. "Supply Leading" thus facilitates transfers of resources from low 
productivity, to high productivity sectors, and promote and stimulate an entrepreneurial 
response in the high productivity sectors. "Supply Leading" is thus seen as representing an 
opportunity to induce growth by financial means.
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42. This paper argues that there is no reason for making the strategies exclusive of each 
other* Due to the heterogenous nature of Zimbabwe’s rural population, a mixture of both 
strategies might be found to be more responsive to the diverse needs. As demonstrated by 
the Zvimba study, there is heterogeneity in financial needs. Some farmers initiate their own 
savings mobilization schemes while others respond to the supply of credit. There are 
various other forms of financial intermediation that different groups opt for and at the same 
time, many people go for more than one option. Some even combine formal and informal 
forms of financial intermediation in order to balance savings mobilization and loan 
portfolios. ; v ;
43. ' Patrick (1966) argued that in most cases there is likely to be an interaction of
"Supply-Leading''and "Demand Following" phenomena. He suggested a sequence where the 
"Supply Leading" strategy is adopted first to induce investment and then as growth takes 
place, the impetus of "Supply Leading" gradually becomes less important and "Demand 
Following" response more dominant. '
44. Although a similar strategy may be recommended for Zimbabwe, the importance of 
adapting it to the local situation should always be borne in mind. The strategy should be 
taken as a broad framework to be modified to accommodate local conditions. It is also 
important to take note of what is available, and then build upon it to ensure sustainability.
45. Until about three years ago, AFC loans to smallholder producers were not flexible 
enough to respond to the heterogenous needs of communal area farmers. With the 
exception of credit for labour payment, loans were given in kind and not in cash. They were 
limited to controlled crops which could be marketed through the Grain marketing board to 
allow for the implementation of the stop-order system of repayment. They were also 
restricted to the recommended crop packs. Until AFC introduced diversification in its 
lending operations the Small Farm Credit Scheme restricted borrowers to the above. It was 
only during the 1989/90 season that AFC for the first time granted loans for such crops as 
tobacco, coffee tea and sugar to smallholder producers. Credit facilities were further 
extended to cattle schemes such as fattening, breeding and stocking.
46. Delivery systems have not been efficient and flexible enough to accommodate the 
diverse group of recipients. Other than confining its lending to the production of a limited 
number of agricultural commodities, loan processing procedures have been lengthy, so that 
in some cases, deliveries have been made after the need of particular inputs has passed. For 
instance, seasonal loans, comprising seed and fertilizer, have been delivered after the 
planting seasons is over. Since the loans are mdde in kind, it then leaves it to the farmer 
to either sell or hold the inputs for the following year. Meanwhile, the farmer is still 
expected to pay interest on the loan which she/he cannot use productively. Some of the 
problems in loan processing are due to the poor quality of field workers who in many cases 
have been difficult to access because of their small numbers. Applications are often sent 
in late and are further held up at head office where final approval is given; The centralized 
nature of AFC’s organization contributes towards inefficient delivery of financial services.
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47. Well developed financial systems introduce borrowers’ incentives in order to capture 
and retain good quality. clientele. Where there is timely loan repayment, institutions 
increase the amount of credit available to a client in subsequent loans, and for prompt 
repayment, interest rate rebates are offered. AFC does not appear to have a clear cut 
policy on the former. Although past performance is taken into account in loan approval, 
it is not clearly*stated that prompt repayment enables one to access larger amounts of credit 
in succeeding periods.
48. In general, effective demand for AFC loans among smallholder producers has been 
very low and has continued to decline because the institution has not structured itself for 
lending to smallholder producers. A lot of potential borrowers have viewed AFC lending 
as very high risk and this has to a large extent been linked to the repayment system and to 
the "once off" action of seizing assets following failure to repay. This action has given AFC 
the reputation of being an unfair and high risk lender. This has resulted in the reluctance 
to borrow by a lot of farmers, including those who have never borrowed, or plan to borrow 
from AFC. Despite the fact that demand has been low, AFC is still not able to meet all of 
the expressed demand. It is constrained by lack of resources in this credit scheme which 
does not generate returns but losses.
SOME MEASURES TAKEN TO OVERCOME PROBLEMS OF DECLINING DEMAND
49. In an effort to reach more farmers in communal and resettlement areas at lower 
transaction costs, the AFC launched the Group Lending Pilot Project in 1989/90. This is 
essentially an on-lending scheme whereby AFC lends to groups at a slightly lower interest 
rate and then the group lends to individuals at a rate paid by AFC’s individual borrowers. 
During the first two years of the Pilot phase AFC was lending to the groups at 10% and the 
groups would lend to their members at 13%. Under this scheme, a large portion of the 
transactions costs are passed onto groups, which have to screen their borrowers and ensure 
loan recovery.
50. The Group Lending Scheme was not only addressing the problem of supply of credit 
to larger numbers of smallholder farmers but was also addressing the gender issue. Although 
it is generally accepted that women carry out over 60% of the agricultural work, financial 
institutions have been slow in accepting them as "farmers". When AFC’s Small Farm Credit 
Scheme was established in 1979 it did not advance loans to married women. In 1983 a major 
development took place. For the first time the Corporation started giving credit to married 
women in their own right provided AFC was satisfied that they were farmers. Even after this 
proclamation, the proportion of women loan recipients remained insignificant. Very few 
were applying for loans. Some of the explanations given for the low demand for loans by 
women were that they did not hold grain marketing cards or that their husbands barred 
them from obtaining credit in their individual capacity. The Group Lending Scheme 
addressed these two problems. Since the loan was advanced to the group, individuals did not 
need to hold marketing cards which, in majority of households, were held by male heads.
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On the latter, most husbands did not seem to mind their wives borrowing through groups. 
This increased the number of women loan recipients significantly. At any one time of the 
pilot scheme women made up more than 50% of the group borrowers.
51. The initial response to the pilot phase of the Group Lending Project was positive 
because it introduced some element of flexibility in lending. The sizes of loans were 
relatively larger and lending activities became more diversified. Some loans even included 
a consumption element. In addition the stop-order system was no longer the single method 
of repayment since some of the enterprises financed by loans were not for controlled 
products nor linked to the central marketing system. Borrowers could make their repayments 
in cash by instalment over an agreed period. This method improved the cash flow situation 
for many borrowers.
52. The Group Lending Scheme has made use of existing informal groups to channel 
credit. A study carried out in Mashonaland East found that the use of existing and fuctional 
multipurpose groups as on-lending channels produced better results than initiating new ones 
specific to group lending. The latter performed poorly with high default rates. (Chimedza, 
1992). AFC has recognized some benefits in linking up formal and informal finance. 
Informal finance possesses certain features which are more effective in dealing with people 
at the individual level, while formal finance may find it too costly to do so because of the 
sizes of the transactions involved. The point to be noted is the importance of recognizing 
the different capacities the various parties have, and taking advantage of them.
53. AFC has recognized these capacities and has taken advantage of them through the 
Group Lending Scheme. It has gone further and linked up with NGOs working in the area 
of finance, through its Linkage Programme. This Programme which has been newly 
introduced to ensure sustainability of lending activities, links the AFC with NGOs through 
the establishment of a credit guarantee scheme, to guarantee loan recipients from its 
affiliate groups. The initiative has reduced the risk borne by AFC. Other than spreading 
the risk, the scheme has established a link between AFC and informal financial institutions. 
It has taken a step towards linking savings mobilisation with credit.
54. It is too soon to assess the impact of the Linkage Programme on efforts to improve 
financial services to smallholder producers. It is also still premature to proclaim its success. 
One can however, note some of the positive points. One of the difficulties in the provision 
of financial services to the rural poor is to design a scheme that can be sustained. The 
interaction of the linkage programme and the Group Lending Scheme begins to address 
that. The Group Lending scheme gives individuals greater responsibility over their financial 
actions. Through peer pressure, the individual is forced to identify financial needs which 
they believe they have the potential to make use of in a productive manner, so that they are 
able to service their loans.
55. The linkage programme on the other hand links informal savings mobilisation 
schemes with a formal institution that directly benefits them by making loans for investment
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available to them. As AFC moves towards becoming a Bank, this linkage becomes more 
meaningful because savings clubs involved in the scheme are likely to choose to place their 
deposits with AFC which invests in ‘rural areas. This is different from depositing with 
Building Societies and Commercial Banks whose reinvestment is almost all in urban areas 
or in the commercial agricultural sector.
OTHER EXISTING SOURCES OF RURAL FINANCE
56. A number of commercial banks have recently established sections that advance loans 
to the rural sector for a variety of investments. For example, ZIMBANK’s Small Business 
Services Division has a co-operatives section that deals with loan applications from co­
operatives, groups (clubs) and associations. These loans are not specifically for agriculture 
but for working capital or acquisition of tools mainly for rural or village industries. In 
addition to giving loans, the Small Business Services Division also provides guidance, advice 
and supervision on the spot to its clients. It is believed that these services are essential for 
the survival of the enterprises.
57. The Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) is an institution which 
provides finance to support development of small industrial and commercial ventures with 
a particular emphasis on those in rural areas. It does not fund agricultural and mining 
ventures. To promote development, it lends to rural projects at concessional interest rates, 
about 2 % below its going rate.
58. There is a potential role for Venture Capital in rural areas. In Venture Capital 
Financing, the financial institution injects seed capital into a new company or existing one 
by purchasing a minority shareholding. This is called "equity financing". It means that the 
new entrepreneur has the capital base needed to purchase equipment, pay for raw materials 
and meet overheads without the burden of interest and loan repayment. Once the company 
is well-established, Venture Capital Companies earn a return on their investment by selling 
their shareholdings to the owner or other interested parties. This is a high risk financial 
innovation which will only give returns to the source of finance if the enterprise is successful. 
This means that Venture Capital Companies have to be highly selective to avoid excessive 
losses. Venture Capital is relatively new in Zimbabwe and to date it has funded a diversity 
of enterprises including Horticultural projects. Venture Capital Companies normally shun 
away from purely agricultural production projects, but they help establish agro-based 
industries. This is an area in which there is a greater deal of potential for rural areas.
59. The Credit Guarantee Company is also promoting investment in rural areas. By 
helping entrepreneurs who would not normally qualify for loans from commercial banks 
because of lack of collateral, the company facilitates investment in rural enterprises as well 
as urban ones. Such facilities could be expanded to further benefit emerging entrepreneurs 
in rural areas.
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60. The above initiatives are very critical in the growth of the rural economy. For a long 
time the provision of credit facilities in smallholder sector has focused on agricultural 
production loans with very little, if any, going to agricultural support industries. The whole 
aim has been to increase agricultural productivity. Manufacturing and repairing of simple 
farm implements have not been viewed as part of the rural industry which indirectly 
contribute to agricultural productivity. Development of such industries has thus, not been 
seen as an integral part of the rural development process. This has therefore resulted in a 
very narrow perception of investment, in the context of rural development. The narrow view 
of investment has impeded financial development in rural areas. Demand for agricultural 
loans is closely tied in with available technologies. Farmers borrow to acquire improved 
technologies. As new technologies are introduced, demand for loans increases. Since the 
largest proportion of loan funds goes to seasonal inputs, which are basically biological 
technologies, the rate at which they are generated has a positive relationship with the 
demand for financial services. Unfortunately, biological technologies take time before they 
are developed, tested, marketed and then accepted by farmers after observing their success. 
Such a process means slow development in financial services, if their growth is a response 
to demand for them.
61. If the perception of investment for rural development were broad enough to include 
support industries, there would always be a demand for investment capital for a wider range 
of enterprises. This would facilitate the creation of integral financial institutions that, 
according to Desai and Mellor, (1993)
"......are necessary and desirable to accomplish financial
intermediation between surplus and deficit units, seasons, years, 
regions and economic sub-systems for agriculture"
The "Demand - Following" phenomenon in financial development would mean creation of 
more financial institutions in response to the demand for services.
CAN COMMERCIAL BANKS PLAY A ROLE?
62. Commercial banks have a role to play in this situation. In the group of smallholder 
producers, there are farmers who are able to use credit productively. It has been argued 
that credit can play an important role in development, but only if savings exist so that they, 
can be mobilised and loaned to producers (Miller, 1977). Commercial banks provide the 
link between savers and borrowers. However, in many cases, e.g. Zimbabwe, there is a 
tendency for commercial banks to divert rural savings away from agriculture to other sectors . 
of the economy. It is thus, desirable for policies that direct banks to reduce drain of rural 
savings to be put into place.
63. Stiglitz (1993) has argued that integrated financial markets emerge as a result of
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deliberate policy. Development of some of the most successful financial sectors, such as 
Japan, USA, Korea and Taiwan has been through public sector support. Government 
intervention-in the operations of commercial banks is often necessary for the banks to be 
more responsive to the needs and circumstances of smallholder producers. In Indonesia for 
instance, the government owned Commercial Bank Rakyat Indonesia has been able to reach 
out to farmers in poor areas and has been successful in the sense that revenues have 
exceeded expenditure and the programmes have been self - sustaining. The bank was 
decentralized to be in physical reach of a large proportion of the rural population by 
establishing units similar to sub-branches and agencies located in simple offices where 
clients could deposit savings, apply for loans and make loan repayments. Loans were made 
for both working and investment capital.
64. Replicating such an initiative in Zimbabwe is more likely to yield positive results. 
This should however, be modified, to suit local conditions. Since commercial banks have 
been reluctant to move into rural areas as true banks, the government of Zimbabwe could 
use AFC to introduce such financial innovations. It is important to note that even though 
most parastatals are being encouraged to privatise, there are some that will need to 
continue to operate as development agents. In the financial sector the AFC is the 
institution which should commercialise but still continue to play its development role. It 
should take the lead in rural financial development particularly in bringing commercial 
finance to the smallholder agricultural sector where the potential for using commercial 
financial services is still unexploited.
65 For AFC to spearhead the above initiative it will need to be decentralised to rural 
areas through sub-branches and agencies. In cases where office space is not easily available 
and where it may not be that viable to maintain an office, mobile banking units could 
present a viable alternative. The main idea would be for the bank to be physically 
accessible by the majority of the population. Such a move by AFC can only be taken with 
a great deal of push and support from government because in the short and perhaps 
medium - term, returns are often negative. The initiative can be quite costly. Subsidies will 
be necessary between the different categories of clients until such a point when the 
institution will have better established its clientele for the various types of financial services 
i.e. for genuine borrowers who are able to utilise loans productively and those with surplus 
funds they wish to deposit. Even after this point AFC will have to continue playing its 
development role in support of the smallholder agricultural sector. However, it is also 
expected that in the long-term, those genuine borrowers who will have used loans to invest 
and pushed their production functions upward will expand their use of financial services and 
generate higher returns for the financial institution.
66. Decentralization of banks should not only be interpreted as establishing units in 
outlying locations in rural areas. It should also be understood to mean decentralization of 
decision making processes particularly in the approval and disbursement of loans. It is 
widely accepted that rapidity, flexibility and ease of transactions are key to the effectiveness 
of financial markets serving the rural low income population. As long as decision making
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in the bank is highly centralized, the above elements cannot be found in the system, and 
even if borrowing interest rates are low, demand for loans will be negatively affected.
67. Subsidized credit schemes have not had much success in many developing countries
particularly because they allocate resources to people who do not make optimal use of them 
and are thus, not able to sustain themselves. It is not the intention here to suggest low 
interest rates for the rural people because it is not the belief that every poor farmer needs 
credit in order to invest in productive agricultural technologies which allow them to shift 
their production functions upward. The idea is to facilitate access to loans by those farmers 
who can use credit productively. It is important to bear in mind that credit never stimulates 
innovation and greater output if farmers are unwilling to adopt better methods or have poor 
incentives to do so. Furthermore, credit is unlikely to be used productively unless it is 
combined with other services and prerequisites. The impact of credit depends on
technology, markets, infra-structure, information and attitudes. Charging low interest rates 
is therefore, not sufficient to make credit productive. Correct market rates are in fact useful 
rationing mechanism which facilitate more efficient allocation of financial resources for 
investment.
68. Absence of banks in rural Zimbabwe has limited resources available for investment 
by farmers who can use credit productively. One of the factors limiting commercial bank 
lending in rural areas, other than lack of collateral, is that they do not effectively mobilise 
savings to allocate to loans. In fact, most of the savings mobilisation is done for them by 
informal groups or farmers who are forced to use banks because payment for their marketed 
produce is done by checks which they can only cash at banks. There appears to be very 
little other incentive for rural people to use banks.
69. Subsidized credit has been found to reduce the incentive to mobilise rural savings and 
prolong the dependence on foreign aid for financing credit projects. The net effect has been 
to benefit larger or better off farmers who normally use up the greater proportion of 
available credit facilities (Eicher,and Doyle, 1982). Chimedza (1993) found that in Zvimba 
Communal area, AFC loan recipients tended not to get involved in savings mobilisation 
initiatives. Savings club membership was made up of people who did not use credit either 
out of choice or because they could not qualify. The study did not examine in detail 
because this was beyond its scope. (This will be an area that is worth pursuing for future 
research). However, the logical conclusion was that since AFC loan recipients had access 
to cheap money, they did not have any incentive to mobilise additional surpluses.
70. The inability of commercial banks to effectively mobilise savings in rural areas cannot 
only be attributed to the common belief that rural households do not have any propensity 
to save. As indicated earlier, a number of studies have shown that rural households have a 
lower saving thresholds than urban ones. It is becoming increasingly clear that a large 
portion of the problem lies with financial institutions themselves. There are hardly any 
commercial banks launching aggressive campaigns to mobilise rural savings. Most bank 
employees servicing the rural sector have not received any special training or exposure to
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effectively deal with the rural population. There are hardly any special advertisements of 
available financial services and their benefits, that are designed for rural areas where 
televisions and newspapers are nor easily accessible. Rural financial institutions do not treat 
their services as products to be marketed mainly because they-do not have a full 
appreciation of the business , potential. They do not possess adequate knowledge of their 
market and thus not able to service it effectively. This paper argues for appropriate human 
capital development in order to realise the desired financial institutional set up.:
HAS CREDIT FROM AFC MADE THE DESIRED IMPACT?
71. To date, there have been very few studies that have attempted to alienate the impact 
of credit on levels of productivity. This is a very difficult exercise. In fact, it is almost 
impossible, because productivity levels are a function of a combination of factors. In most 
cases the assumptions on the response to input use have been wrong. The reponse has often 
been overrated and does riot reflect the variability in either farming circumstances or 
farmer’s management abilities. There have however, been attempts to carry out a 
comparative analysis of productivity levels between borrowers and non-borrowers. A study 
carried out in Zvimba Communal area, under similar farming conditions found that output 
levels of borrowers and non borrowers were not significantly different^ (Chimedza, 1993). 
In fact, the study found that AFC loan recipients registered lower earnings from maize 
output than members of savings clubs. (Table VI) During the same period, expenditure on 
agricultural inputs was not significantly different for borrowers and non-borrowers. In 
general, the group of AFC loan recipients although having been selected from the relatively 
better-off farmers, were not performing any better than those who did not enjoy access to 
credit. This was also true for the rate of investment in productive assets, mainly farm 
implements. Their rate of saving (cash deposits) was not significantly different from that of 
non-rborrowers.,
72. Results from this study were cause for concern, particularly when at the policy 
making level, the assumption has been that availability of credit leads to increased 
productivity. The link between, availability pf credit and productivity levels has been 
assumed but not tested. The absence of this link in a situation such as Zyimba raises a 
number of questions, both on the demand and supply side of credit. On the demand size, 
and important question is whether the loan recipients in Zvimba had reached a level where 
they had the capacity to utilise credit productively. Credit can only be productive when a 
farmer has reached a certain level in acceptance, adoption and understanding of the 
improved technologies. Furthermore, a farmer should have reached a level of wanting to 
commercialise because without wanting to make a profit one cannot guarantee repayment 
and sustainability. On the supply side the question is whether the product was right. Did the 
institution provide the required types of loans and were the delivery systems appropriate?
73. A large proportion of the population in communal areas has not reached a level of 
utilising credit efficiently, particularly the AFC type credit. However, this does not mean
18
that this category of farmers cannot benefit from the provision of financial services. What 
it means is that the type of service that AFC has offered them has not been the most 
appropriate because it has not effectively addressed their needs. Results from the 
comparative analysis of the behaviour of borrowers and non-borrowers suggest that maybe 
a different type of financial service might work better for the various groups of farmers.
HOW AFC CAN BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO SMALLHOLDER BORROWERS
74. It is generally accepted that fragmentation of financial markets in most developing
countries, which resulted in a bias in favour of credit advancement with little focus on 
savings mobilisation, has created inefficiencies in the delivery of financial sendees. The 
argument being that the design of the institutions is such that they would be able to offer 
both loan granting and savings mobilisation services using the same infrastructure. Focusing 
on one area of financial services only means that there is underutilisation of resources in 
a situation of scarcity. The AFC falls in this category of financial institutions. As the only 
formal lending institution advancing loans to smallholder producers, there is no good reason 
why it has not been involved in the mobilisation of deposits. Yet it would reduce transaction 
costs for both the institutions and borrowers if the two functions were carried out under one 
roof. For example, when a client already operates a deposit account, the manager of the 
institution gets to know her and when she applies for a loan the manager already has most 
of the information she needs about the client. The fact that the manager does not have to
look for information about a client reduces the amount of work involved in loan approval.
Furthermore, if an institution is involved in both savings mobilisation and provision of credit, 
it cuts on transaction costs by reallocating the savings that it has already mobilised to credit. 
It does not go out to borrow all its loan funds as is the current situation with AFC.
75. AFC’s recent proposal to operate as a commercial bank is an attempt to improve
efficiencies and become more profitable. However, for this to be effective, AFC needs to 
undergo some structural changes. One of the major criticisms levelled at formal financial 
institutions in their dealings with small borrowers is lack of flexibility. Small farmers have 
heterogeneous needs. Their financial needs are often urgent and therefore need speedy 
responses. In most cases small farmers have relatively low levels of education and therefore 
require loan procedures that are simple to follow. All these are features that would be 
essential to have in a financial institution that serves the needs of people. Absence of these 
features from most formal institutions has created barriers for borrowers. For example, in 
the case of AFC, loan approvals may take up to four months. Some needs, particularly 
consumption needs, cannot wait for four months. Completion of application forms has been 
a barrier for those who have had no formal education. Some application forms are very 
long and use language that borrowers may not be familiar with. There is need to simplify 
application procedures. One of the ways to get around the problems of delays in loan 
approval and complications in application procedures would be to decentralize the 
institutions so that some of these facilities are as locality specific as is possible.
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76. Because flexibility, rapidity and ease of transactions are essential elements in the 
provision of loans to smallholders, decentralization of financial institutions, which allows for 
the development of intimate knowledge between the client and the institutions, can allow 
for special arrangements to be made. For example, a facility similar to an overdraft can be 
made to some special .clients. The decision to extend such a facility would be based on the 
institution’s relationship with the; client over time. Such facilities can make it possible for 
clients to take greater risks and have a more diversified portfolio of investments.
77. In order to play its new role effectively, AFC would need to retrain its employees and 
give them more exposure to rural banking. They could benefit from experiences of such 
institutions as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and the Commercial Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia. While most of AFC’s employees have had some experience with loan 
advancement, very few have had exposure to savings mobilisation. Different approaches may 
be required and the challenges will be different. It may be that on the one hand there is 
need for closer links with informal groups while a direct approach to individuals may work 
for the other. Making active use of such agencies as church groups, grassroots NGOs and 
extension agencies with a wealth of local knowledge and experience can facilitate efficient 
lending. It would benefit AFC to establish a formal and effective liason with such groups. 
All this needs to be explored and staff will be required to gear themselves towards adapting 
and being relevant. The processes of developing this relevant human resource are manifold. 
Short-term training, interaction with other formal and informal institutions and study visits 
are some of the options. These processes entail costs which the new AFC should be 
prepared to bear in its efforts to be both more responsive and profitable.
78. The need for management skills in the process of transforming the AFC cannot be 
overemphasised. A lot of the credit schemes and development banks have collapsed mainly 
because of poor management. In some cases institutional overheads have tended to absorb 
more funds than the actual lending activities. Since overheads do not directly yield returns, 
this has resulted in negative rates of return to institutions which are only able to continue 
operating because of donor support. In the case of AFC, it will have to reorient its staff 
towards viable lending. Currently AFC has been guided by rigid lending criteria and by a 
narrow focus on agricultural production loans. In many cases the viability of the enterprise 
has not been closely scrutinised. In the last couple of years AFC has made efforts to move 
towards viable lending. More needs to be done in this area. The new institution, which will 
have a more diversified loan portfolio will need to develop a more competent team of loans 
officers who should manage loans more efficiently and cut down on costs to the institution. 
Sound selection of loan recipients, which is dependent on availability of information about 
the clients results in higher repayment rates strengthening the financial management.
79. The move towards operating as a commercial bank is, among other things an 
acknowledgement by AFC that smallholder producers’ financial needs are not confined to 
borrowing but also depositing. It is an acceptance that there are some rural households with 
financial surpluses but no investment options and others with deficits for their viable
. investment opportunities. However, although desirable, it does not follow that the investor
2 0
must be the source of savings. The key role of the AFC as a bank would be to intermediate 
between these two groups of households and ensure that each one is able to access the 
service it requires. The ultimate objective for all involved should be to generate growth in 
the economy. For this growth to occur, capital formation is crucial. Capital is not formed 
until savings are transformed into productive goods. Savings must therefore precede capital 
formation.
80. Rural areas have had low investment rates partly because of lack of financial 
development but also because of lack of investment opportunities. Focusing efforts on 
developing rural financial systems alone without creating investment opportunities will not 
necessarily result in economic growth. There is need to link the relevant institutions so that 
an appropriate investment environment is created. In rural Zimbabwe agriculture is the 
main economic activity and most investment is directed towards this sector. It is imperative 
for financial development to link up with sources of agricultural growth. Agricultural 
research and extension are very crucial because they produce and communicate the new 
technologies that increase productivity. The link between finance, research and extension 
needs to be strengthened to allow capital formation in the agricultural sector.
81. For AFC to be effective and more responsive, it has to fully appreciate the importance 
of mobilising savings and at the same time recognise the fact that smallholder producers 
have a greater than zero propensity to save. A study by Mauri (1984) which showed that 
rural people have a lower saving threshold than urban people came to the conclusion that 
the saving threshold in rural areas was lower partly because of the absence of many 
consumer goods. In Ms study of rural households in Sri Lanka , Bouman (1984) concluded 
that thrift came naturally for households with irregular income flows. He found the majority 
of Ms sample households saving about 26% of their income. CMmedza’s (1993) study of 
households in one rural are in Zimbabwe concurred with Bouman’s findings. It estimated 
that households saved about 32% of their income during a particularly good season.
82. Although for a long time the assumption was that rural households had a zero marginal 
propensity to save, there is now a wealth of evidence to the contrary. The feet that the 
potential for mobilising all the surpluses in rural areas is there does not mean that 
establishing a bank and locating it in rural areas will do the job. The bank will have to reach 
out to people and provide incentives for them to deposit all their surpluses wMch would 
otherwise be hoarded. Other than providing attractive rates of returns which relate to the 
inflation rates positively, banks will need to be as easily accessible both physically and non- 
physically. This implies decentralisation and use of mobile urnts wMch is necessitated by 
sparse settlement patterns that are a feature of many parts of rural Zimbabwe. Application 
procedures need to be simplified. Clients should be able to access bank officials (including 
managers) for any queries they may have. In general, there should be no barriers keeping 
clients from obtaining vital information directly from responsible sources.
83. An important incentive would be giving preferential treatment to savers in loan 
applications. This means that there should be a direct relationsMp between a client’s
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deposits and loan portfolio. This encourages potential borrowers to mobilise savings.
' CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
84. Zimbabwe’s rural financial sector clearly needs to be restructured in order to be more 
responsive to the needs and conditions of smallholder producers. This paper argues that the 
new AFC should take the lead in this process.lt contends that government has a central role 
to play in giving direction to financial development. As an arm of government, which is in 
the process of being transformed to be in line with the new economic order, AFC is the 
right entry point for a new strategy in the rural financial sector. While it is pushing 
commercial finance to the smallholder sector, it should also continue with its development 
role in order to meet the heterogeneous needs of the rural population.
85. A number of problem areas which need to be addressed have been noted. The 
fragmentation of financial services, which has resulted in institutions not being able to take 
advantage of scale and scope economies has been responsible for some of the higher than 
necessary transaction costs. The suggestion here is to 4ntegrate financial services and make 
use of the infrastructure to provide support services that enable financial institutions to 
sustain themselves. A proposal such as is made by Desai and Mellor, (1993) for a 
multifunction rural financial system may be worth looking into. Multifunction institutions 
directly and indirectly undertake operation of farm level loans, extension, input sales, 
produce marketing, consumer goods sales, collection of deposits or share capital, borrowing 
and loan recovery. Such an institution would be ideal for many areas where both physical 
and socio-economic infra-structure are not well developed. At the moment there are some 
institutions offering some of these services e.g. marketing co-operatives. They however need 
strengthening for more efficiency and broader coverage in terms of people arid areas of
• operation. Designing appropriate multifunction institutions is an area that is worth investing 
in because it allows for scale and scope economies.
86. Mobilisation of rural savings has not been given its due attention by many formal 
financial institutions . AFC will need to put more effort into developing incentives for. 
potential savers. In the process of integrating financial services, it is important to also 
integrate the client i.e. potential borrowers should be motivated to save so that the borrower 
and the saver are one and the same. In pursuing this objective, it is worth investigating into 
why borrowers tend to have a lower marginal propensity to save than non-borrowers. 
Seeking answers to such questions will help in designing institutions that can mobilise and 
allocate financial resources more efficiently.
87. It has been accepted that smallholders are riskier borrowers. Lack of collateral has 
been found to be one of their major impediments to borrowing. With respect to collateral, 
there has been a tendency for formal lending institutions to treat borrowers as a
. homogenous group, and therefore seek the same forms of collateral. This is one area which
. ..requires rigorous studies which can come with recommendations for different forms of
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collateral that will be more suited to the heterogenous group of smallholder borrowers. Not 
enough attention has been paid to possible existing options and it is strongly recommended 
that work in this area should be supported. Such studies need to focus most of their 
energies on the demand side of credit.
88. The development of rural financial systems should be closely accompanied by 
technology innovations and a conducive investment environment. These elements need to 
come as a package for productivity to occur. This calls for closer links between financial 
development, technical research, extension and other delivery and receiving systems. The 
macro-economic policy environment should be supportive of the initiatives. Government 
has an important role to play. It has to intervene and stir things in the right direction 
through policy instruments and other forms of support. Government’s role is also critical 
in supporting technology development and transfer. Without the generation of technology, 
financial development becomes meaningless, because there is no productive capital that can 
make economic growth possible through expanded productivity. It is thus recommended that 
stronger links be established between agricultural research, extension and financial 
development.
FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS
89. This study has demonstrated a need for a new approach and different strategies for 
rural financial development. It has highlighted the need to for the design of new financial 
institutions that are more responsive to rural people’s needs and conditions. Relevant future 
research should thus focus on designing these new financial institutions. Research is required 
to investigate both the demand and supply sides of finance to contribute to the proposed 
initiative. It is particularly important to understand the demand side so that the institution 
designed suits the conditions of rural people. In this regard, it is imperative to establish the 
productivity of inputs and relate that to the cost of borrowing including the risk involved. 
The assumption has been that returns on inputs are high enough to cover the cost of 
borrowing and leave some profit for the borrower. With interest rates of up to 35%, this 
assumption needs to be tested so that appropriate recommendations can be made.
90. The need to link savers and borrowers through financial intermediation has been 
highlighted. The paper has stressed the importance of savings mobilisation preceding 
lending. One of the important recommendations made in the study is that institutions 
providing deposit services and loans, should, as an incentive for savings mobilisation, relate 
one’s loan portfolio to their savings deposits. This means that there should be a positive 
correlation between the sizes of savings and loans.
91. This paper has also noted studies that have shown that borrowers tend to save less than 
non-borrowers. Reasons for this low saving rate by borrowers have not been explored 
rigorously in the Zimbabwean situation. This a very important research area because of the 
central role of savings in financial development. This study proposes a rigorous analysis of
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saving behaviour of borrowers. It is anticipated that such a study will contribute towards the 
design of appropriate saving incentives.
92. The importance of strengthening linkages between complimentary institutions that 
contribute to capital formation in the agricultural sector was noted. It was also observed that 
there is currently not much interaction between these institutions that are key players in the 
rural development process. This area of strengthening institutional linkages requires 
investigation which will come up with policy recommendations.
93 The proposed research areas should all contribute towards the design of financial 
institutions that will make a difference to Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector.
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Table I Savings Club Membership Between 1970 and 1991














Some clubs have registered as co-operatives mainly because they needed bank loans
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Table II Informal groups involved in Financial Intermediation in Rural Areas in Zimbabwe in 1985
Types o f groups Primary purpose No. of 
groups
Members % o f rural 
. - households
Savings Development Movement Savings mobilisation 6.000 150.000 18,8
Silveira House Credit 567 59.535 7.4
Windmill -Inputs for cash/credit 2.000 60.000 7.5
Agricura Inputs for cash/credit n/a n/a n/a



































































1980 38 34 28 100 164.075
1981 34 30 36 100 179.871
1982 37 35 28 . 100 228.711
1983 41 32 27 100 304.236
1984 43 32 25 100 333.161
1985 (March 31st) 42 35 23 100 412.567
Source: Taken from Anthony Slange, 1989 (ed) Mario Masini for the FAO-FINAFRICA Working Group "Rural 
Finance Profiles in African Countries, Volume 2.
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Table V Distribution o f Financial Institutions - 1992
NAME Total No. of 
outlets in the 
country
No. of rural 
outlets
% of total (rural 
institute)
CABS 72' 11 15
Founders Building Society 29 1 3
Barclays Bank / 52 14 30
Standard Chartered 69 14 20
Zimhank 71 28 39.
Beverly 14 5 36
Bank of Credit and Commerce 46 8 17
POSB 195 128 66
Total 548 209 38
Source: Data was obtained by author from interviews with Manager in the institutions
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Table VI: Income From Crop Sales by Group/Year
AFC LWF SC NP Total Sample
1985
Maize 809.85 1193.82 603.70 641.95 812.33
(34) (14) (28) (21) (97)
Groundnuts 195.45 227.33 101.40 145.00 167.30
(5) (7) (21) (ID (44)
Millet 70.00 0.0 21.00 144.0 78.00
(4) (5) (2) (11)
Cotton 817.4 467.75 0.0 0.0 642.58
(4) (6) (10)
Total 890 1162.1 590.06 548.05 797.6
(36) (21) (32) (28) (117)
1986
Maize 690.00 1155.96 743.57 712,23 825.44
(34) (16) (30) (25) (105)
Groundnuts 270.25 0.0 128.67 260.00 220.64
(18) (0) (20) (10) (28)
Millet 105.50 o .o 280.50 24.00 136.70
(9) (0) (7) (3) (12)
Cotton 545.75 ■ 321.17 0.0 250.00 372.31
(9) (7) (2) (18)
Total 954.00 1170.00 839.00 750.00 865.00
1987 '
Maize 181.55 325.20 232.00 401.06 285.00
(16) (18) (31) (24) (41)
Groundnuts 50.00 0.0 16.67 0.0 33.36
(4) (25) (41)
Millet 40.00 44.85 0.0 0.0 42.43
(4) (4) (8)
Cotton 285.00 284.91 0.0 0.0 284.95
(10) (10) (20)
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